James C. Bennett claims that the U.S. Congress should formally declare war against Saddam Hussein and his Ba'athist regime. Such a declaration would serve as a contract between the government and the American people by which clear goals are set by the consent of the governed, allowing the government to mobilize to achieve its desired war-time goals, and finally to demobilize in the aftermath of victory.

Certain concessions by the governed would have to be made during wartime, such as greater monitoring of citizens in the present war against terrorism, but with the understanding that they are temporary measures that serve the interests of the people and, most importantly, will be terminated upon conclusion of war.

"Such a declaration would commit both nations [U.S. and Britain] to full victory, and also to commit themselves to a clear and definitive end to hostilities. It would mean that whatever internal security measures needed to deal with terrorist assaults in the course of the war would be done under the traditional and well-understood constitutional exceptions for time of war, which also have a logical stopping point."

The goal in the upcoming battle against Saddam Hussein is regime change, and Bush, according to Bennett, should seek a declaration of war from Congress to achieve it in observance of Anglo-American constitutional traditions. Bennett also points out that failure to achieve regime change scuttled three major American military engagements in the past half-century: Korea, Vietnam, and Gulf I.

There are a few questions Bennett does not address, however. Bush has already clearly stated the goal of regime change in Baghdad. He has made his case before the American people, many of whom remain unconvinced. What good would a declaration do?

Furthermore, the campaign to depose Saddam Hussein and his regime is only one battle in a much larger war with many, as yet unknown or undisclosed, strategies. Will the president have to ask Congress for a declaration of war for each military engagement necessary to defeat terrorism, especially as each engagement will in reality be part of one big conflict? For example, would Roosevelt have had to get such a declaration to invade Sicily or Normandy, both strategic operations, in an on-going war to defeat Nazism, Fascism, and Japanese Imperialism?

Why not just one big declaration of war to defeat terrorism? But this is just as problematic as there are no clear criteria to measure progress in the war and to know definitively when it has been won. Bennett makes much of using a metric to determine if war goals are being met. But how can one find such a metric in a war whose outlines are vague or, at least, only definable in the immediate present; for example, overthrowing Saddam Hussein and dealing with North Korea afterward?

This lack of definition precludes, in my view, a declaration of war by Congress. In what terms would a declaration be couched? Defeating terrorism is a realistic and necessary goal but, unlike bringing down the regimes of Hitler and Hirohito, not easily outlined.

This war is a hydra with many tentacles. What final head do we have to lop off to know there is ultimate victory? Where is the current analogy to the fall of Berlin in all this? Deposing Saddam Hussein is only the beginning, not the end, of a prolonged conflict.

Because Bennett's concerns are valid and must be addressed, what effect will the difficulty of making a declaration of war in the current conflict have on civil liberties in the U.S. and the Anglo-American democratic traditions we cherish?