By Zachary Abuza*

Sunday, 19 November 2006, is the two-month anniversary of the Thai coup. Though the coup was executed for many different reasons, the Thaksin administration’s mishandling of the southern insurgency that had already claimed some 1,700 lives, was a major factor. The insurgency was spiraling out of control and the six bombings over a 30-minute period in Hat Yai, a major commercial center, concerned many that the coup was bleeding north of the three Muslim-majority provinces.

The prospects of the situation improving seemed much brighter with the coup. Coup leader Sonthi Boonyaratglin promised, consistency in personnel and policies, improved inter-agency coordination and intelligence sharing, ending the culture of impunity of security personnel, a willingness to implement some of the findings of the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), and a desire to improve diplomatic relations with Malaysia. There was also an acknowledgement by the government of the insurgent’s Islamist agenda and demands.

The government of caretaker Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont deserves credit for implementing a swath of new polices to improve relations with the Muslim community: These include the restoration of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Command (SBPAC) & CPM-43, the dropping of charges against some 58 Tak Bai protestors, a renewed pledge to solve the disappearance of Muslim human rights activist Somchai, which the government now labels “murder,” the abolition of blacklists, and a willingness to implement sharia law. It also included a public apology to the Muslim community for the previous government’s policies:

The military leaders also announced that they were holding secret talks with the “insurgents.” The government announced that the two sides had reached a “Joint Peace and Development Plan for South Thailand,” in which the “insurgents” dropped demand for an independent Islamic state. Yet the “five core insurgents” representing Bersatu, PULO, Barisan Revolusi Nasional Kongres (BRN-K), the Pattani Islamic Liberation Front, and the Muslim Mujahideen Movement of Pattani, have no operational control over the insurgency. The government demanded that the insurgents implement a one month cease fire as a show of good will and proof of command and control, later shortened to two weeks.

Despite these overtures, the violence has continued unabated. In the 60-day period after the coup there were almost 200 violent incidences, and the rate of killing is just under the pre-coup 2006 average of 1.7 people/day. In the two-month period, 91 people were killed, including 5 police and 11 soldiers, and 68 civilians and 232 were wounded, including 52 soldiers and police officers and six monks. There have been 38 bombings and 3 attempted bombings, and 19 arson attacks that destroyed at least 11 schools.

The two groups most involved in the violence, the GMIP and BRN-C have not signed up. The Thai government has searched for ways to contact their leaders who remain at large. They see little reason to negotiate, as they have suffered precious little on the battlefield. There have been few arrests and they are able to attack at will. Indeed, one should anticipate a surge of violence against fellow Muslims in the coming weeks as the insurgent attempt to scuttle the talks, discredit those who are trying to negotiate with the government, and impose their writ on the population.

*counterterrorismblog.org
November 19, 2006
http://counterterrorismblog.org/2006/11/
the_thai_coup_two_months_on_in.php
Cross-posted with permission

---

---

Related: War Against Islamo-fascism, Southeast Asia

---