by Bill Levinson

As reported yesterday, Michael Moore’s Minutemen crossed the chemical/biological/nuclear threshold by using a weapon of mass destruction against a primarily-civilian target in Iraq. (See the link for a picture of a female Iraqi civilian who was injured by the insurgents’ chemical weapon.)

Official U.S. policy is that chemical = biological = nuclear. A chemical or biological attack on our Armed Forces, and presumably our civilian population, or that of an ally, is equivalent to a nuclear attack on the United States. This requires retaliation in kind and, as the United States has disarmed itself of all chemical and biological weapons, the nature of the retaliation should be obvious. Policies and words deter only when backed by action. Failure to retaliate with nuclear weapons, or so many conventional explosives and incendiaries as to equal nuclear weapons in their effects, undermines the credibility of the United States and tells other terrorists and rogue nations that they are in fact free to use weapons of mass destruction while violating the Hague Convention’s prohibition on the use of chemical weapons.

Not with Impunity: Assessing US Policy for Retaliating to a Chemical or Biological Attack

Lt Col Harry W. Conley, USAF

Sen. Jesse Helms: Suppose somebody used chemical weapons or poison gas on people in the United States. . . . Would they damn well regret it?
Secretary of Defense William Perry: Yes.
Helms: I want to know what the response will be if one of these rogue nations uses poison gas or chemical weaponry against either us or our allies. . . . What is the response of this country going to be?
Perry: Our response would be devastating.
Helms: Devastating- to them?
Perry: To them, yes. . . . And I believe they would know that it would be devastating to them.
Helms: Let the message go out.

We also want to know what our country’s response is going to be, as does every two-bit dictator and terrorist on earth. The manner of our response to this latest atrocity by Michael Moore’s Minutemen will show them whether they can expect to get away with, for example, blowing up a rail car full of liquified chlorine upwind from a major American city, or releasing something like Ebola or anthrax in our streets. Here is our recommended response, assuming that a suitable target can be found for it.

The light damage radius of a 1-kiloton weapon is about a mile, and the blast radius is proportional to the cube root of the explosive force. Therefore, if the W54 or a similar weapon was set for a 0.01 kiloton explosion, the light damage radius would be around 120 meters, or slightly longer than a football field. (The blast might break windows and cause other relatively minor harm further away.) Serious damage and heavy casualties would take place within 60 or so meters. It must be added, of course, that an air burst must be used to avoid contaminating everything downwind with radioactive fallout. If property or personnel belonging to the perpetrators of the gas attack is no closer than, for example, half a mile to anything we don’t want to damage or destroy, the use of a small nuclear weapon to set an example and show that U.S. deterrent policies mean exactly what thay say would be a reasonable and appropriate response.