Palestinian Politics: “Good Guy Fatah vs. ‘Bad Guy’ Hamas” is No Policy Solution
June 4, 2007, 10:59 am |
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By Barry Rubin
Given the Middle East’s grim circumstances and poor prospects for peacemaking, it is tempting to see the Palestinian scene as a struggle between good-guy moderates, Fatah, and bad-guy extremists, Hamas. If so, the best policy seems simple: support Fatah against Hamas in hopes of strengthening those favoring peace and compromise.
It would be good if this were true but unfortunately it is not. Fatah is not better than Hamas because even if it is slightly less extreme, Fatah itself is the core of the problem. Only by recognizing reality can policymakers be freed to find better ways to ameliorate the situation–including reducing the Palestinian people’s suffering.
Why does this conflict remain unsolved? If the issue is merely a wish by Palestinians, led by Fatah, to create a West Bank-Gaza Strip state, the issue would have been settled long ago with such a solution. But despite Western media interviews in which the Palestinian Authority (PA) leader Mahmoud Abbas expresses such ideas, this is not Fatah’s line. The problems are legion:
- Abbas is a weak leader incapable of restoring order or making the compromises necessary to achieve peace.
- Abbas himself is not so moderate, having a strong personal dedication to the demand that all Palestinians who so wish can go to live in Israel rather than a Palestinian state, both a deal-breaker in itself and a sign of a higher priority on destroying Israel than creating a viable state for the Palestinians or ending the remains of the occupation.
- Abbas lacks support within Fatah itself, which remains overwhelmingly hardline, seeking a total victory in which Israel would be wiped off the map.
- Fatah is so riddled with corruption, factionalism, and incompetence that it has earned the disdain which many Palestinians have toward it.
- Fatah’s strategy is not to offer a peaceful alternative vision but to compete with Hamas in maximal demands and the glorification of violence.
1. Weakness as Leader
- Abbas lacks political skills, having literally never even made a public speech before becoming the PA leader.
- He has no personal base of support within Fatah. Being a behind-the-scenes bureaucratic intellectual by nature and experience he is timid.
- Nor is he particularly moderate, only being so in comparison to others in Fatah.
- To some extent, the only reason he remains leader is that he is a useful front man for the real power-brokers in convincing the West that Fatah is not so extremist.
- He has failed completely to advance negotiations with Israel, solve the PA’s problems, fix Fatah’s ailments, take control of the Gaza Strip after the Israeli withdrawal, or stop Hamas’ growing power. Abbas has raised and dropped plans in quick succession without making any attempt to implement them. His skills are more than overmatched by his colleagues’ radicalism, the younger generation’s challenge, the security forces’ assertive independence, and Hamas’ rivalry. Even within Fatah, his personal support was far less than 20 percent, and his few backers fought with him and among themselves.
There is no possibility that he will take a strong hold over the movement or the PA and he is incapable of defeating Hamas or taking decisive steps toward compromise and peace.
2. Fatah’s Shortcomings
- Widespread corruption. The movement has done zero to clean up its reputation in the 18 months since a humiliating election defeat. Even the highest leaders are badly corrupted, even by regional standards, including Abbas’s closest advisors. This means, for example, aid money is not used to help the people but goes into their bank accounts.
- Incompetence: Fatah did a terrible job of running the PLO for 40 years and the PA for 12 years. It was indifferent to building a good infrastructure or running successful institutions. Health, education, economic progress and social welfare took a back seat to armed struggle against Israel.
- Factionalism: Fatah’s official leader is not Abu Mazin but the hardline, popular, pro-Syrian Farouq Qaddumi who opposed the Oslo agreement. Fatah leaders know Abbas is too weak to challenge their power but is valuable in presenting a more moderate face to the world, better able to retain Western support and funding than an openly hardline leader.
- Hardly one member of the Fatah Central Committee is personally committed to Abu Mazin or known for taking a moderate stance. Fatah is still in the hands of Arafat loyalists who see no reason to change their view that the conflict’s only acceptable outcome is a Palestinian state in place of Israel.
- Factionalism makes Fatah incapable of acting decisively or changing course. The dissident younger generation is led by the terrorist al-Aqsa Brigade, which is an integral part of Fatah, and Fatah’s grassroots’ Tanzim group. The main leader is Marwan Barghuti, serving a life sentence in an Israeli jail as organizer of the 2000-2005 terrorist campaign. Barghouti’s strategy is an alliance with Hamas, not more moderation. Since the election defeat, Fatah has made no reform or leadership change to resolve the factionalism which caused it.
- Fatah and the PA under its rule has never interfered with, arrested or punished those launching terrorist attacks against Israel. There has never been a single case of a Fatah member being sanctioned for such behavior. In short, Fatah has not lifted a finger to stop terrorism or educate toward moderation.
3. Fatah’s Strategy
In 2000, Fatah rejected a peace agreement that would have quickly ended the Israeli presence, created a Palestinian state, made possible repatriation of refugees, and provided more than $23 billion in international payments. Instead, it launched a disastrous five-year-long war based mainly on terrorism, and ending with Hamas taking over control of the PA.
Moreover, the group insists on the return of all Palestinian refugees to Israel–rather than their resettlement in a Palestinian state–as a way of subverting Israel. Abu Mazin is personally strongly wedded to this demand which is absolutely critical in Fatah’s thinking. Qaddumi explained, “The Right of Return of the refugees to Haifa and Jaffa is more important than statehood.”[1]
Equally, Fatah favors a two-stage process–in which any Palestinian state would immediately be used as a base for a renewed conflict to conquer Israel–not a two-state peace. It remains loyal to the 1974 program proclaiming that any Palestinian state is only a way-station to total victory.
One might expect Fatah leaders to take a pragmatic stance along the following lines: We are in a terrible situation and have no state because of our incorrect strategy. Violence, radicalism, and maximalist demands have not brought benefits. We must instead try a strategy of compromise, peace, and moderation. Let us accept Israel’s existence; get our own state; bring home the refugees to become productive citizens; and focus on economic, social, and cultural development to benefit our people.
This would have required a new program based on self-criticism of the past and a sense of reality about the present. Fatah could have made a deal with Israel to end the conflict and obtain a state. It might have focused on raising living standards; convincing refugees to return to a Palestinian state (rather than demand they move to Israel); gaining credibility with Israel as a peace partner; creating a strong economy, schools, and health system; and other such steps. There is no evidence that the leadership of Fatah or the PA–except for a handful of people–ever seriously considered such a program.
Refusing to acknowledge the situation means Fatah rejected the usual response of those being defeated: changing course, being cautious, reducing expectations, and offering compromises. Instead, it tells its own members and people: Our armed struggle is winning. Continue the battle, produce more martyrs, make no concessions, gain international support by projecting an image of moderation, and we will win in the end as Israel collapses or surrenders, no matter how many years are required, lives it costs, or resources must be spent.
Fatah has never told Palestinians that in 2000 the United States and Israel offered a comprehensive negotiated solution including an independent Palestinian state with its capital in east Jerusalem. Misinformed that Israel poisoned Arafat and told that it wants to wipe out the Palestinians, that Israel is the enemy of Islam, has no right to exist, and offers them nothing, Palestinians understandably see long-term armed struggle as their only alternative. Told repeatedly–by Fatah as well as Hamas–that total victory is just and that the whole world supports them, they believe this program will triumph. Certainly, such a conclusion makes them unlikely to opt for a comprehensive moderate rethinking of their world view.
This political culture–spread through the PA-controlled schools, mosques, and media–has now been passed to a new generation. At the same time, the kind of program required as a minimal basis needed to achieve peace with Israel is basically defined as treason, a charge that the many rivals for leadership in Fatah would not hesitate to fling at anyone deemed excessively moderate.
More immediately, Fatah failed to use the opportunity of a complete Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip to build a stable polity. Instead, the collapse of Gaza in anarchy, radicalism, and violence provides a vision of what a Fatah-led state would look like.
For Fatah, weakness and failure is guaranteed by internal divisions and the inability to make key decisions, on one hand, and the lack of moderate goals or a viable strategy, on the other hand. As a result, it is unable to achieve a state, improve its people’s material well-being, or end the violence.
As a result of all these factors, other than on the specific issue of Islamism there is little difference between Hamas and Fatah. Given Fatah’s low credibility, poor performance, and inability to offer success or an alternative vision, it is understandable–though very regrettable–that most Palestinians support Hamas.
Conclusions
Here is the paradox: Money is given Fatah it is likely to be stolen, not used to improve the lives of Palestinians. Arms and military training given Fatah will be turned against Israel
Fatah is unwilling to challenge Hamas militarily or even to restrain it–and smaller radical groups–from terror attacks and rocket launching against Israel. It will either reject or not implement any promises it makes in this regard, as experience as repeatedly shown.
The correct response to this unpleasant situation is to decertify the Palestinian movement. Since it failed the test of the peace process, and events since then, and is now in the hands of a movement that opposed the peace process, there is no sense giving it the rewards based on pledges to do otherwise. As before 1993, the world must wait until there emerges a Palestinian movement that is truly ready to cease terrorism, negotiate seriously, and make a permanent peace with Israel. Such a movement would be offered great rewards but until then there is nothing to be gained by dealing with Fatah or Hamas.
NOTES
[1] Wall Street Journal, March 29, 2002
Barry Rubin is Director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, Interdisciplinary Center university. His latest book, The Truth about Syria
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