Saudi and Gulf leaders held discussions in Riyadh this week on proposed moves toward greater unity. The meeting, however, revealed little genuine enthusiasm for such a project outside of Saudi Arabia itself and beleaguered Bahrain.
But while it is unlikely that proposals for greater Gulf unity will bear fruit, the very fact that they are being raised at all is significant. It reflects two things: firstly, the overriding concerns felt by Saudi Arabia regarding Iranian ambitions in the Gulf area and beyond; and secondly, the Saudi conviction since the Arab Spring that the West and the US cannot be relied upon and that therefore the Gulf monarchies themselves must organize – in their own neighborhood as well as outside it – to defend their interests.
Michael Rubin, a former editor of the Middle East Quarterly, is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and a senior lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School. He formerly served as a political adviser to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq and has written extensively about Iranian history and politics. He is the author of Into the Shadows: Radical Vigilantes in Khatami’s Iran (2001) and the co-author of Eternal Iran (2005). On March 19, Rubin addressed the Middle East Forum in Philadelphia about the efficacy of sanctions on Iran as well as the prospect and logistics of an Israeli strike.
Can sanctions against the Iranian regime be effective? Michael Rubin addressed this question by citing Tehran’s former nuclear negotiator, who revealed that previous suspensions of Iranian nuclear enrichment had merely been temporary ploys aimed at ameliorating international pressure and preventing a UN consensus on sanctions. Rubin argued that Iran’s bleak current economic outlook is due not to sanctions but to the regime’s mismanagement of the economy.
Huge balls of fire and mushrooms of smoke seen on the latest videos from Homs indicate that the Syrian army is using more powerful weapons in its assault on the remaining rebel strongholds in the city.
This is what the daily shelling of Homs used to look like when the Baba Amro district was still under rebel control:
February 8, 2012
Explosions seen on the latest videos look rather different:
A recurring question of the past year has been whether Israel can come out of the unrest of the “Arab Spring” with any new allies. The point is hardly immaterial: The future of Israel’s peace treaty with Egypt hangs in the balance, as Egyptian political parties call for a referendum on the Camp David Accords. Observers also point to the possibility of a revolt against Hashemite rule in Amman instigated by Bedouin tribes and/or Palestinians in Jordan. This too could derail that country’s peace treaty with Israel.
Much written and said about the Middle East has always been fantasy. But nowadays the proportion of fantasy to reality is higher than ever. And number one on that list is the war hysteria with Iran.
Israel may have to attack Iran some day. But not this week, month, or even year. That’s true for very good reasons.
Iran doesn’t have deliverable nuclear weapons. It is not about to have deliverable nuclear weapons. Israel is not about to attack Iran. The United States is certainly not about to attack Iran. The whole idea that the leaders of Iran are crazed suicide-oriented people who expect the twelfth imam to arrive next Thursday is simply not true.
The iron fist against “terrorist gangs” as promised by Bashar Assad got off to a fairly impressive start two weeks ago. Homs — the Benghazi of the Syrian rebels — has been subjected to massive and sustained shelling for days, causing hundreds of fatalities among the defenders. With the fist heading for its third week, however, the spectacular artillery barrages seem to have delivered little.
This is not the first time during the uprising that the Syrian army has stormed urban areas. In July and August, the army recaptured Hama, Deir ez Zor, and Latakia after these had been taken over by crowds of protesters reinforced by army defectors.
For the second time in a few months we have seen a crazy global Israel-About-to-Attack-Iran Story. I don’t want to go into all of the details but this tale is an example of how the media has just lost it completely due to a combination of laziness (reporters don’t really do research or check sources); agenda; ignorance; and good old sensationalism. Partly, too, it arises from the difficulty of the mass media in dealing with the Internet media era and the difficulty of the Internet media in achieving decent journalistic standards.
A couple of months ago a level of hysteria was reached on the basis of three stories:
It is the far-flung, easternmost island of Greece, 80 miles from Rhodes, 170 miles west of Cyprus, but just 1 mile off the coast of Turkey. Kastelorizo (in Greek, Καστελόριζο; or officially Megisti, Μεγίστη) is tiny, comprising just 5 square miles, plus some yet smaller, uninhabited islands. Its 430 inhabitants are way down from 10,000 in the late nineteenth century. The Lonely Planet travel guide has picked it as one of the four best Greek islands (out of thousands) for diving and snorkeling. There’s no public transportation from nearby Anatolia, only from distant Rhodes by airplane or ferry.
It’s not every day that someone like the U.S. secretary of defense forecasts an ally’s move but this just happened when Leon Panetta said that he believes, in the paraphrase of a Washington Post reporter, that “there is a strong likelihood that Israel will strike Iran in April, May or June.” Thoughts on this unusual statement:
Iran is quickly becoming the cause celebre and darling of the Left. On a Canadian campus I recently listened to Zafar Bangash, director of the Islamic Society of York Region, make an outrageous defense of Iran and scathing attack on Western civilization — Imperialism, according to Bangash, is the greatest problem in the world, Iran, however, has been assigned favourite victim status by Bangash. He was being sponsored by leftist groups, Islamic students, a Jewish anti-Israel group called Independent Jewish Voices (IJV), and the “Hamilton Coalition to Stop the War.” That last group concentrates on only one country for very special critical treatment — Israel.
As U.S. military operations in Afghanistan drag on inconclusively, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the Taliban insurgency is gaining ground. In the first six months of 2010, for example, there was a 31 percent rise in civilian casualties while the Shari’a was implemented in areas hitherto inaccessible to the Taliban.[1] Insurgent attacks in the first quarter of 2011 grew by 51 percent compared with the previous year[2] while the Afghan security forces have been increasingly penetrated by the Taliban.[3]
As Canada (my country) knows all too well, when you get in bed with an elephant, you get squashed. Canada now has a semi-independent foreign policy with respect to Israel (we favour Israel over violent Islamic states but the USA has begun to distance itself away from Israel) and Canada has found a way to make its own decisions despite having such a large and domineering neighbour. We have found a way to develop our own economy and society while finding mutually beneficial arrangements with our largest trading partner (and we are the USA’s largest trading partner).
Editors’ note: Yoaz Hendel now works in the Israeli prime minister’s office. This article was written before his government service; views expressed herein are his alone.
While the Obama administration has not reconciled itself to the futility of curbing Tehran’s nuclear buildup through diplomatic means, most Israelis have given up hope that the international sanctions can dissuade the Islamic Republic from acquiring the means to murder by the millions. Israel’s leadership faces a stark choice — either come to terms with a nuclear Iran or launch a preemptive military strike.
Pakistan is facing a serious crisis today and despite the proclivity of the nation’s elites to blame external forces, the wounds are largely self-inflicted. India is not the biggest danger Pakistan faces today. It is the extremist groups that the security establishment has nurtured over the years that have turned against the Pakistani state. The Pakistani army has yet to reconcile itself to the idea that Afghanistan should be something other than its strategic backyard, under the control of its proxies such as the Taliban, and continues to struggle with its paranoia that India is encroaching on Afghanistan to encircle its old enemy. As a result, Pakistan is unable to take corrective measures that can bring some semblance of stability to a conflict-ridden nation.