By Gary Gerofsky
As Iran races to the nuclear finish line, showing off its capabilities with long-range nuclear-tip-ready missiles and every other kind of system that we thought in years past was beyond their capability, we must ask ourselves what will change when next year Iran rules the Middle East by dint of their regional technological nuclear advantage.
by Daniel Pipes*
Only 13 years ago the Turkish and Syrian governments came close to war, a culmination of long-existing tensions over borders, terrorism, water, contending alliances, and domestic factors. From an account of mine about the mood in October 1998:
by Steven Shamrak
Editor’s note: This article is in response to a PBS interview with CIA Director Leon Panetta regarding the targeted assassination of Osama bin Laden.
“The authority here was to kill bin Laden” - CIA Director Leon Panetta
By Fern Sidman
Now that the hoopla over the successful United States “hit” on arch terrorist Osama bin Laden has begun to fade into the annals of history, the stark realization that the US and the free world are still bereft of a concrete plan of action to stem the tide of al-Qaeda terrorism is beginning to set in. Having spent close to 10 years assiduously tracking down the elusive 9/11 mastermind, we hasten to remind the CIA, along with the various and sundry intelligence networks, that the task of eradicating Islamic radicals bent on global domination demands replication of the kind of “muscle” that bagged bin Laden.
by Daniel Pipes*
The official hymn of the U.S. Marine Corps famously begins with “From the Halls of Montezuma to the shores of Tripoli, we fight our country’s battles on the land as on the sea.” The reference to Tripoli alludes to the Battle of Derna of 1805, the first overseas land combat fought by U.S. troops and a decisive American victory.
Recent fighting in Libya prompts a question: Should the marines be sent anew to the shores of Tripoli, this time to protect not the high seas but the rebellious peoples of Libya rising against their government and calling for assistance as they are strafed from the air by troops loyal to Mu’ammar al-Qaddafi?
by Andrew M. Roe*
The Afghan conflict has refocused world attention on Waziristan. Once one of the British Empire’s most volatile territories, the remote small province in northwestern Pakistan is now home to Taliban insurgents, al-Qaeda fighters, rogue elements within the Pakistani military, and Western jihadists, who use it as a base to rest, heal, rearm, train, and plan before they launch again across the porous border into Afghanistan. It is also the area where Osama bin Laden and many of his top lieutenants are probably hiding and a regular target for U.S. air strikes against key Taliban personnel. Pakistani military operations destroyed insurgent forces and caused mass civilian dislocation, yet efforts to produce a lasting peace deal with the local tribesmen and the Taliban have proved futile. Waziristan remains a dangerous and unpredictable region with the potential to unhinge President Hamid Karzai’s fragile regime in Afghanistan, threaten the Pakistani government, and pose a major challenge to regional stability.
By Barry Rubin
In 1978 and 1979 I followed the Iranian revolution on a daily and hourly basis. Even before the hostage crisis, recognizing the importance of this event, I began work on a book. The title? Paved with Good Intentions. This came from the expression, “The road to Hell is paved with good intentions.”
This is precisely might be what is happening now. Out of “good intentions,” the United States is headed–though I hopes it can still be averted–the biggest catastrophe in the history of its relations with the Middle East. Thirty years after Iran’s revolution produced a similar situation, nothing has been learned by U.S. policymakers. Nothing.
Edited by Antonio Giustozzi. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009. 420 pp. $32
Reviewed by John Williams, U.S. Naval Academy*
In his edited volume, Giustozzi, a fellow at the London School of Economics, has put together a timely and relevant collection of essays that advances the ongoing debate over what he terms the “main war of the early twenty-first century.”
by Audrey Kurth Cronin
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009. 330 pp. $29.95
Reviewed by Max Abrahms*
A battle is raging in terrorism studies. Proponents of the “strategic model” claim that rational people participate in terrorist groups mainly for the political return. Proponents of the “natural systems model” claim that rational people participate in terrorist groups mainly for some form of social gain. The first model argues that terrorists attack civilians for the collective benefit of coercing political concessions, whereas the natural systems model claims that individuals engage in terrorism for the personal, selective benefit of participating in an exciting, tight-knit, social group. Although this debate is spearheaded by academics, it is hardly academic: The question of terrorist motives is fundamental to counterterrorism because one cannot expect to cure a malady without understanding its underlying cause.[1]
A briefing by Amatzia Baram*
Amatzia Baram is a professor in the Department of the History of the Middle East and director of the Center for Iraq Studies at the University of Haifa, Israel. Prior to the invasion of Iraq, he served as a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. In 2003-2005 he was Senior Fellow at the USIP and the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C., and in 2006 taught an honors course on Iraq at Melbourne University. He also advised various branches of the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations on Iraq and the Gulf region. Presently he is a Goldman Guest Professor for Middle East at Georgetown University. On October 28, Mr. Baram addressed the Middle East Forum in New York on the current political situation in Iraq. The following is a brief summary, including updates to the end of November 2010.
by Mark Wilbanks and Efraim Karsh*
Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 8, 2008, Gen. David H. Petraeus, the top U.S. and coalition forces commander in Iraq, reported a dramatic reduction in violence levels and civilian deaths from fifteen months before when Iraq seemed on the brink of civil war.[1] Petraeus attributed this turning point to the increased numbers of coalition and Iraqi forces, part of the surge declared by President George W. Bush in January 2007, but he gave equal credit to the predominantly Sunni popular movement known as the Sons of Iraq (SOI). “These volunteers have contributed significantly in various areas,” he said. “With their assistance and with relentless pursuit of al-Qaeda-Iraq, the threat posed by AQI, while still lethal and substantial, has been reduced significantly.”[2]
By Andrew L. Jaffee
A seemingly farcical and losing battle by American-backed Iraqi forces raises some serious questions about the future of the fledgling Middle East democracy (which today we find has the 2nd largest oil reserves on Earth).
1) Has President Obama’s announcement that the, “American combat mission in Iraq has ended. Operation Iraqi Freedom is over,” scared the heck of out Iraqi citizens and emboldened Islamist enemies of democracy? After all, “…nearly 60 percent [of Iraqis] feel it is the wrong time for U.S. soldiers to leave…” 2) Has living under the dictatorship of Saddam created a sense of sheepishness in Iraqis — a lack of venturousness, innovation, initiative…? 3) Is the average Iraqi military recruit sheepish? 4) Why are some of Iraq’s Sunnis and Shi’ites very un-sheepish about killing each other? 5) Do American military strategists really understand the complexities of “Urban Low-Intensity Conflict (Urban-LIC) warfare?” Unfortunately, it’s most likely all of the above. Consider the details of the recent failed military venture:
By Barry Rubin
After acceding to U.S. requests for nine months by freezing construction on existing Jewish settlements in the West Bank and also not building over the pre-1967 frontier in Jerusalem, Israel got nothing.
While Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu seemed willing to continue it in some form, pressures from within his coalition made that impossible.Therefore, the freeze is coming to an end, though Israel is still ready to discuss limits on new construction. Palestinian Authority (PA) leader Mahmoud Abbas is threatening to walk out of the once-every-two-weeks direct talks.
Screaming, “Allahu Akbar” (”G#d is great!”), while trying to kill people?!?!?! Should we call it “religious murder?” Well these Iraqi terrorists got nailed in the act — instantaneously — and filmed themselves getting sent to “heaven?!?!?.” Watch the video, then read the description of the tactical details provided by Jeremy Buff (below):
By Andrew Whitehead
The modern State of Israel recently attempted to peacefully dissuade a flotilla of ships from landing “humanitarian” supplies at the blockaded Gaza Strip. The flotilla was invited several times by the Israeli government to offload the supplies in Israel proper where the supplies would be delivered once they had been inspected for contraband. The flotilla was determined to run the blockade and was boarded by elements of the IDF.
There is indisputable video evidence of how murderous the Jihadist occupants of the Turkish ship Mavi Marmara planned to become as they attacked an IDF boarding party. As they were boarding the ship, the leading element of IDF Commandos who were carrying non-lethal paintball guns were immediately and viscously attacked and beaten by men wielding clubs, steel rods, knives, wrist-rocket slingshots and other instruments meant to maim and kill. The IDF soldiers were given permission to use their sidearms only after one of them was thrown 30 feet from the upper to lower deck.
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