By Barry Rubin

The Middle East is a region where so many things seem to happen, so little appears to change, and far too much is said about it all.

Partly this is due to the area’s turbulence; partly to obsessive hyper-reporting in an era when everyone claims to be a Middle East expert and the most basic exercise of logic is often absent. Yet, at the same time, silly ideas and policies often also correspond to real needs.

Here’s a list of examples:

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by Michelle Mostovy-Eisenberg*

In order to fully understand Middle Eastern politics and society, you must first grasp the underlying basis of Arab culture — specifically, the tribal organization central to life in the region, according to anthropologist and author Philip Carl Salzman.

During a lunchtime event held last week at the Center City law firm of Pepper Hamilton, about 50 people gathered to learn about the roots of contemporary Arab life and the potent affect it can have on conflicts in the region. The lecture was sponsored by the Middle East Forum, a Philadelphia-based think tank.

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Despite UN Designation, Arab Culture Deserves Better ‘Capital’ Than Syria

By Jonathan Spyer and Nir Boms

The ancient city of Damascus received another mark of recognition last week. Following in the wake of Liverpool - which was recognized as the European Capital of Culture, and Stavanger in Norway, which was named the non-EU European Capital of Culture, UNESCO last week designated Damascus as the Arab Capital of Culture for 2008.

In a speech celebrating this decision, Syrian President Bashar Assad chose to highlight a very specific element of his capital city’s culture — namely, Damascus’s self-appointed role as the center of Arab ‘resistance.’ “Damascus is the capital of resistance culture by symbolizing Arab culture” he declared, and went on to define ‘resistance culture’ as “the culture of freedom and defending freedom.”

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By Jonathan Spyer

The recent killing of Captain Wissam Eid of the Lebanese Internal Security Force, and the shooting deaths of eight Shi’ite rioters - including four Hizbullah supporters - at the Mar Mikhael intersection in southern Beirut last week offered the latest evidence of the potential of the political stalemate in Lebanon to spill over into renewed civil conflict.

Substantive compromise on the issues dividing the country seems impossible. The overriding cause of the crisis is Syria’s determination to prevent political stability in its smaller neighbor on any but its own terms.

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by Eyal Zisser*

On May 27, 2007, Syrians elected Bashar al-Assad to a second 7-year term as president in a referendum in which, according to results published two days later by the Ministry of Interior, Assad received the support of 97.62 percent of the voters, a slight improvement upon the 97.24 percent support he received in the first referendum.[1] Such results, though, have little significance. Syrian referendums are a government-orchestrated show and have nothing in common with normal democratic procedure. Nevertheless, the referendum is a reminder that Assad has survived seven years in power. His regime appears more stable than ever, no mean feat given that Bashar’s rule has coincided with perhaps the most difficult years the Baath regime has known in the past four decades.

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By Barry Rubin

The two main areas where the alliance of radical forces in the Middle East confront Western interests and pose a danger of major instability are Iran’s drive for nuclear weapons and Syria’s efforts to destabilize Iraq. This article considers these two issues. First, it examines what effect Iran’s obtaining nuclear weapons would have on Middle East politics, with an emphasis on scenarios that would occur even if Iran never actually uses them. Second, it asks why it is that the interests of Iran’s ally, Syria, compel it to destabilize Iraq.

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By Barry Rubin

A strange malady has apparently descended on part of Israel’s, much of America’s, and most of Europe’s elite. Let’s call it Syriantoxication, the belief that there is a real chance to make peace with Syria and–in its extreme version–that Lebanon should be sacrificed for that goal.

To call this wishful thinking is understatement. Why is this happening?

Few Israelis believe that negotiations with Palestinians will lead anywhere. Those on the right think it’s dangerous, those in the center believe it can be done without harm and for limited benefit, those on the left doubt it will work but wishful thinking compels them to hope even without conviction.

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By Barry Rubin

The idea that poverty, relative backwardness, violence, and instability must be caused by external circumstances is engrained in much of the Western intelligentsia. It encourages a tendency to apologize for those regimes and radical groups which are the main cause of continued stagnation and suffering.

In fact, of course, the problems are very much-and usually more-based on history, culture, geography, ideology, and choices made. For example, Muslim-majority countries have much lower participation of women in the economy; are more rural and agricultural; and have had no Enlightenment or industrial revolution. Governments don’t care about developing good health and educational systems. Lack of freedom and cultural restrictions–things changed and challenged in Europe from the sixteenth century onwards–harm economic development and social progress. And so on.

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by Adam Pechter*

On November 8, 2005, Syrian police arrested Syrian physician and political activist Kamal al-Labwani as he arrived at Damascus International Airport upon his return from a trip to France and the United States. In Washington, he had met with officials at the White House.[1] A Syrian court charged him with “communicating with a foreign country and inciting it to initiate aggression against Syria.”[2] While imprisoned, his fate remained uncertain pending sentencing. On December 13, 2006, President George W. Bush called for Bashar al-Assad’s regime to “immediately free all political prisoners” and named six imprisoned dissidents, including Labwani.[3]

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By Barry Rubin

The alternative Western view of Middle East strategy–so influential in academic, media, and to some extent diplomatic circles–has a six-point program that boils down as:

Make deals with Iran, Syria, Hamas, and Hizballah; ally with Muslim Brotherhoods; and split Iran and Syria.

Those more extreme who advocate this approach are sympathetic to these forces, seeing them as more misunderstood victim than aggressive oppressor; the more moderate among them merely think the radicals can be moderated through concessions and confidence-building measures. In other words, they are not really adversaries but either already good guys or can be converted into playing that role.

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By Lee Harris

“THE AGE OF illusions is over,” the historian Walter Laqueur wrote recently, referring to the illusions the West continues to entertain about the confrontation with radical Islam. Needless to say, Laqueur did not mean that we in the West no longer have any illusions on this subject; those still abound. He meant, rather, that we can no longer afford to harbor them and that the time has come to shed them. Yet human beings have great difficulty in freeing themselves from illusions — even quite dangerous ones — as long as they offer comfort and provide peace of mind. The best place to start the freeing process is by heeding those who are willing to tell us disturbing truths. Barry Rubin, the distinguished scholar of the Middle East, falls into this tiny minority. His brilliant and provocative new book, The Truth about Syria, not only challenges the illusions of those naturally inclined to prefer lovely daydream over harsh reality; it also challenges the illusions of those in the West who, by their own definition, are hard-nosed realists and wily pragmatists.

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By Barry Rubin

Working on new material for the seventh edition of the Israel-Arab Reader, a documentary work that I edit along with Walter Laqueur, reminds me that there is nothing like examining old material as a way to gain new insights.

This edition updates the book whose current contents ended in 2000 with the failure of the peace process. The most important developments since then are basically the renewed intifada; Israeli withdrawals from southern Lebanon and the Gaza Strip; the growing direct involvement of Hizballah and Iran, including the 2006 war; and Hamas’ triumph over Fatah in the 2006 elections and in seizing control of the Gaza Strip.

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By Barry Rubin

Quick! Tell me. Who’s desperate to make a deal? Who acts as if they are the weaker party, eager to negotiate solutions in order to end their people’s suffering and the costs of conflict?

Certainly not Iran. It has been pushing ahead with its nuclear program for more than three years during a period of intense Western diplomatic effort, lots of talk about sanctions, and even the implementation of some. Iran is indifferent to threats of attack or warnings of isolation. To a large extent — but not completely — the regime thinks the West is bluffing. But if Tehran really sought nuclear energy, not bombs, it could easily cooperate and have power stations in operation far faster. And if Iran was really acting out of fear of being surrounded by American power, it could help resolve the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq — instead of inflaming them — in exchange for U.S. forces withdrawing more quickly.

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by Robert G. Rabil*

The Iranian and Syrian relationship with Hezbollah developed from a combination of ideological, domestic, and regional factors. Both Tehran and Damascus found Hezbollah to be a useful proxy to further regional objectives. Today, however, Hezbollah’s position has changed. Tehran’s growing strength is matched by Damascus’s regional weakness. As overt Syrian suzerainty over Lebanon fades and Hezbollah increases its regional role without regard to the Lebanese government, the nature of Hezbollah’s relations to Syria has changed. The group has outgrown its subservient relationship to Damascus. Hezbollah is no longer the junior partner in the axis.

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By Barry Rubin

Everybody in Washington has been waiting for General David H. Petraeaus to give his report on the Iraq war. Expectations became most inflated, as if he would deliver America of this seemingly unsolvable problem in a messianic manner.

Now Petraeaus has spoken and he has done a pretty good job. There are some major paradoxes in his analysis and prescription but given the nature of the issue that was certainly inevitable.

For Democrats, eager to have an American withdrawal from Iraq, Petraeaus became something of a trap. To show they were patriotic and supported the troops, congressional Democrats praised Petraeaus. Now, however, disliking some of the things he said, they look rather craven trying to find ways to criticize him.

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